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Etienne Allred
12/1/2021
SOE and its Contribution to the Allied War Effort during the Second World War
Founded in July 1940, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) was formed from three
smaller intelligence groups: section D of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the EH
subdepartment of the Foreign Office, and the General Staff Research (GS/R) subdepartment of
the War Office.1 After the fall of France, Churchill instructed Hugh Dalton to form SOE in order
to “set Europe ablaze.”2 Dalton, the Minister of Economic Warfare, took to the task
wholeheartedly. Dynamic yet abrasive, Dalton best served the agency with his “ambitious idea of
what SOE could do in Europe and…belligerence of spirit attuned to the times.”3 In November
1940 Dalton recruited the equally ambitious Colin Gubbins, the organization’s future director, to
serve as the SOE director of training and operations. Gubbins “organized in depth training for
recruits in unarmed combat, firearms, sabotage equipment and camouflage materials.”4 Under
the combined leadership of these two men, SOE contributed significantly to the Allied war effort
in occupied Europe through espionage, sabotage, assassination and subversion.
Backed by Churchill, SOE was granted significant liberties, to the great displeasure of
other government organizations. The British establishment had a negative view of the
organization. Sir Stewart Menzies, head of the SIS, called the agency “amateur, dangerous and
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bogus.”5 These remarks were unfounded and were based more in spite than in fact. SIS and other
government agencies took poorly to SOE’s operational freedom and the ungentlemanly nature of
its operations. While Britain was no stranger to sabotage and subversion, opponents of SOE
disingenuously argued “that of course we had never done anything of the kind before… [an
argument which showed that]… the educated classes had gotten out of touch with their own
history.”6 The supposed novelty of SOE’s aims was used as a justification for its dangerous
inexperience.
However, SOE’s critics could point to the inexperience of many of the organization’s
employees as signs of its amateurism. As a teenager, Maggie Norris was hired to cut the hair of
female agents who were returning from missions in France.7 Gwendoline Lees came from a
civilian background and was hired as a member of the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry, a volunteer
organization who notably provided medical care to soldiers in the First World War. She was later
recruited to serve as a nurse to SOE while also operating key signals stations in England and
Cairo.8 Similarly to Lees, Vera Atkins was a civilian who was initially hired to work as an SOE
secretary. She was soon promoted to being an intelligence officer, a role in which Atkins was
responsible for interviewing and briefing agents before sending them into the field.9 Despite their
lack of experience with subversive operations prior to being hired, these three women proved
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their worth to SOE by either meeting, or in the case of Atkins, exceeding the expectations placed
on them.
From the beginning, while facing these accusations of incompetance, SOE also had to
contend with enemies within the British intelligence community. Its biggest rival was fellow
intelligence organization SIS, who felt that the fledgling organization “threatened its monopoly
of clandestine activity...moreover its spectacular actions could harass the quiet nature of
intelligence gathering.”10 In addition to these valid concerns, SIS animosity towards SOE
stemmed from jealousy. The main section of SOE was formerly section D of SIS. In 1940, the
subsection split off, a fact “SIS never fully accepted.... its subsequent behavior only too often
resembled that of an embittered spouse.”11 This behavior included withholding relevant
information from SOE and preventing “SOE by various means from operating at all by sea into
Brittany out of Cornwall.”12 Both of these actions further complicated SOE missions
unnecessarily.
Despite its bitter rivalry with SIS, the two organizations were able to put aside their
differences in Norway, allowing SOE to conduct important missions in the country. This was
accomplished due to SIS intelligence gathering being given operational priority, thus allowing
the agency to be less concerned over how SOE’s subversive operations would affect its own
missions. As a result, there were “numerous examples of cooperation between the two
organizations…they exchanged intelligence, shared clandestine radio stations and used the same
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fishing boats to transport agents into Norway…”13. The two competing agencies were
encouraged to work together by the logistical difficulties, which included their lack of experience
with the country’s language and the hazards of its harsh climate.14 However, this unprecedented
cooperation did not mean that SIS gave SOE free reign. In Norway, SOE planned to focus on
industrial sabotage, but “was somewhat limited by the overall SIS policy which put a ban on
much activity on the west coast.”15 Nevertheless, despite these limitations on the scope and
location of its undertakings, SOE was able to send “542 operatives…into Norway to carry out a
range of activities including sabotage and subversion, training and arming the military resistance,
forming guerrilla groups and assassination.”16 Of these activities, the heavy water sabotage was
the most notable and impactful.
In 1939, Norway became a crucial theatre of operations for SOE once it became clear that
the Germans were trying to gain control of the heavy water manufactured at Vemork’s Norsk
Hydro. Having lost access to France’s supply of heavy water, Germany was desperate for a
source of the precious commodity key to its efforts to create a nuclear bomb. In July 1942, Leif
Tronstad, a former employee at the plant, brough forth intelligence that clearly demonstrated
Germany’s nuclear ambitions in Norway. At Tronstad’s behest, the British government deemed
that it “of the highest importance that the existing stocks of heavy water…at Norsk Hydro
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works…should be destroyed, together with a plant essential for its production.”17 To accomplish
these three SOE-led expeditions were sent out.
Operation Grouse was launched on October 18th, 1942, with the objectives of reporting
on the weather conditions and state of German defenses at Vemork. On that same day, Germany
announced that “all saboteurs, military and civilian alike were to be executed without a trial,”18 a
fact that did not impede Grouse but would lead to the downfall of the following mission. With
the data provided by Grouse, Operation Freshman went into Norway to destroy the current
stocks of heavy water. The mission was particularly dangerous due to its novel approach. Juliette
Desplat describes it as a mission that “was incredibly audacious and required extraordinary
physical conditions and observation skills…nothing like it had ever been attempted before…it
involved an approach by glider, a parachute, a demolition task and an entrance test…”19.
However, despite the immense amount training and planning that went into the mission, the
bomber and glider responsible transporting the agents were shot down. Those who survived the
crash “were put into battle and wiped out to the last man.”20
After the failure of Operation Freshman, the Germans significantly increased security at
the Vemork plant. As the crew of Operation Grouse had remained in Norway undetected, it was
instructed to continue gather intelligence and weather information for a new undertaking in
Norway. Once the next mission, Operation Gunnerside, was ready to begin, the Grouse crew,
renamed Swallow, would assist them in their duties. Gunnerside had the same objectives as
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Freshman.21 To avoid another failure, in addition to undergoing extensive training, the agents
were provided with extensive maps of the region and a well-thought-out escape route to Sweden.
Joachim Rønneberg, who led Operation Gunnerside, was surprised by how detailed the maps
were saying, “I do not think that any group sent into Europe was supplied with such good
intelligence.”22 Superior intelligence and Rønneberg’s knowledge of his native Norway helped
make Gunnerside a success.
Despite obstacles, such as weather delays and landing 25 kilometers off target, the
Gunnerside agents made their way to the heavy water plant, successfully destroying it on
February 17, 1943. Rønneberg and his crew were so effective that, to his surprise, “the Germans
never had the faintest idea of what really happened”.23 While the heavy water plant was
eventually rebuilt, SOE deprived Germany from access to heavy water for several months.24 The
eventual success of SOE’s heavy water sabotage showed both its determination to aid the British
war effort as well as its ability to work around the limitations set by its rivals.
While SIS did not always impede SOE’s actions, the Foreign Office proved to be a more
persistent and significant rival to the fledging secret agency. It disapproved of the organization’s
tendencies to “support resistance organisations regardless of their political affiliation…”25 While
the Foreign Office was concerned with protecting Britain's national image and advancing the
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country’s political interests, SOE was willing to work with any group who could help lead an
effective resistance movement. For example, at the beginning of the war, SOE worked with
Dragoljub Mihailovič’s royalist Chetniks in Yugoslavia, who showed more promise than other
resistance groups in the country. However, “growing Chetnik collaboration with the Axis against
Tito [Mihailovič’s communist rival] finally led Britain to switch its support to the ‘Partisans’ in
December 1943.”26 A similar issue also occurred Greece. During their various operations in
Greece, SOE would work alongside both the National Democratic Greek League (EDES) and the
Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELAS), two bitter rivals who would later fight in a bloody
civil war.27
Due to such precedents, the Foreign Office believed SOE would prioritize working with
groups who would best serve a resistance movement rather than with those whose interests best
coincided with Britain’s. As a result, it placed strict restrictions on SOE operations in Turkey,
particularly due to the country’s fragile political status. On one hand the Turkish government
was “not very willing to co-operate with the Special Operations Executive so as to avoid
provoking the Germans”28, who many thought were on the verge of invading the Middle East
through Turkey. On the other hand, Britain feared that too much SOE activity would alienate
Turkey. While initially tasked with helping the SOE, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugesson, the
British Ambassador to Ankara, promptly cut off all ties to the subversive organization, saying it
“would be quite impossible for me to have any connections with such activities and at the same
time to remain responsible for good relations between our governments.”29
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To mediate between these concerns, the Foreign Office decreed that “the role of SOE
should be advisory and consultative and that it should not prepare demolition plans”30 without
the assent of the Foreign Office. To ensure that SOE could operate effectively without the
meddling of Turkish authorities, agents installed sabotage equipment in Northern Syria and
agreed to only enter Turkey “as part of a British force going to assist Turkey or if Turkey joined
the Axis.”31 Furthermore, SOE operatives were restricted to bringing one suitcase worth of
explosives into equipment. With these restrictions, SOE accomplished little in Turkey, aside
from establishing a small “network of agents…in the event of a German invasion.”32
Despite the government’s limitations and its distrust of the organization, SOE played a
pivotal role in one of the most famous and crucial missions of the Second World War. By aiding
the French resistance and sending elite Jedburgh teams, SOE made the legendary Operation
Overlord possible. Prior to this, SOE had set up two major sections in France: F section and RF
section. F section usually worked independently from Charles de Gaulle, a prominent general
who controlled the Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur (FFI).33 Consisting of primarily of nonFrench agents, F section’s primary goal was to “assist the advance of allied armies by specific
demolitions.”34 On the other hand, RF section worked in conjunction with Charles de Gaulle and
was primarily preoccupied with supporting the maquis, an underground branch of the French
resistance that operated in the south east.35
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Churchill had high hopes for the maquis, which he believed would be key to his
Mediterranean strategy. He hoped the French resistance could impede the advance of German
troops in the Rhone Valley, which would remove the need to divert troops from Italy and
accelerate Sir Harold Alexander’s invasion of Italy.36 To this end, Churchill tentatively sent SOE
members to provide weapons and supplies to the maquis and the French resistance.37 This aid
was increased when the British cabinet’s fear of “another Tito-Mihailovič quarrel placed in their
lap by SOE”38 was alleviated by a January 1944 meeting between Churchill and representatives
of the maquis. However, bad weather and the preferential allocation of resources for the
Normandy landings over those in Provence meant the maquis did not receive sufficient support.
By the end of February, “no more than 53 missions out of the 186 planned to the Maquis had
succeeded…”39 Due to this discouraging news and pressure from Allied commander, Churchill
lost hope for his plan in Provence and Italy, instead switching his focus to Normandy.
On D-Day, SOE-trained Jedburgh teams were parachuted into France to pave the way for
the Allied landings in Normandy and the smaller-scale landings in Provence. Jedburgh teams
consisted of a French officer, an American or English officer, and a wireless operator, generally
an American, English or French non-commissioned officer. Their goal was to “send back
intelligence, organize supply drops to local resistance forces, and carry out any subversive
operations that were available… such as bridge blowing, ambushes [and] harassing the
enemy.”40 These objectives were met with brilliant success. One particularly noteworthy team
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“led hundreds of operations, making the railways and the large roads between Brive and
Toulouse…practically unusable.”41 Another team harassed a retreating German force of 20,000
troops to such an extent that their commander was forced to surrender.42 Through subversion and
stubborn harassment, Jedburgh teams were able to delay the progress of many German units,
thus contributing greatly to D-Day’s eventual success.
While SOE was able to thrive amid France’s difficult political climate, international
politics complicated SOE’s missions in Poland, a country initially viewed as vital to the
resistance against Germany. Even before the Second World War and the creation of SOE, Major
Collin Gubbins met with Colonel Guido Cano of the 2nd Bureau of Polish Intelligence Services
to discuss “aspects of the potential anti-German guerrilla activity in the region in the event of
war and Polish defeat”43. This activity included the sabotage of the railways between Lwów and
western Poland and the destruction of Polish oil fields. In the initial years following Germany’s
invasion of Poland, British and Polish military and intelligence units worked well together. A
1941 SOE report was optimistic, saying that “the military possibilities of the organization inside
Poland are most apparent…the existence of even 35,000 fully armed men is an obvious threat to
the German lines of communication with the Russian front.”44
By June 1942, however, SOE’s glowing opinion on Poland’s utility would drastically
change. With the Soviet Union’s entry onto the side of the Allies, Britain now had to carefully
consider its dealings with Poland. Relations between the Soviet Union and Poland were
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incredibly poor, as on “5 March 1940…the leading committee of the Soviet Communist
Party…officially ratified a decision taken by Stalin a few days earlier to execute about 15,000
Polish prisoners of war…”45 While this certainly complicated relations amongst the three
countries, Britain and SOE were able to navigate this difficult climate for a few years by
ensuring allowing a large portion of the Polish resistance movement “to be independent of their
direct control, unlike clandestine movements in most other German-occupied countries.”46
Unfortunately, this strategy would only work for a few years. In April 1943, Joseph Goebbels,
Germany’s propaganda minister, revealed the bodies from the 1940 massacre in the Katyn forest.
His goal was to “complicate, if not split, the alliance between the Western Powers and their
junior Polish ally…from their major wartime Soviet ally.”47
This scheme certainly worked and forced Britain to placate the Soviet Union by including
it in sabotage missions that the SOE performed alongside Polish agents. In addition, Britain
withdrew its support for resistance groups led by individuals that the Soviet Union disapproved
of. Instead of supporting and equipping the multiple groups, SOE only backed Stanislaw
Mikolajczyk’s Peasant Party, in hopes that this would entice the Soviet Union to renew its
diplomatic relations with Poland. Finally, Britain was “clearly unable, unwilling or uncaring to
take a firm stance” on the issue of Polish independence, out of fear of antagonizing the Soviets.48
This hurt both the potential effectiveness of SOE in Poland and the overall relationship Britain
had with the country.
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Additionally, local attitudes limited the effectiveness and extent of SOE operations in
certain countries. A 1940 report to the Chief of Staff Review of Future Strategy indicated that
Austria was not “ready or able to rise against Germany.”49 However, Churchill viewed an
Austrian resistance movement as the key to weakening Germany’s control of Central Europe.
Consequently, in 1941, SOE began preparing to conduct missions in Austria with two principal
purposes in mind: “to assist in the disintegration of the Third Reich by fostering the…separatist
uprising in Austria; and…to bring about the ‘restoration of Austria as a national unit’ within the
framework of a central European federation.”50
To accomplish these lofty objectives, SOE contacted groups from all ends of the Austrian
political spectrum, ranging from Social Democrats to Monarchists. Despite these efforts, the
SOE’s plans for a significant resistance movement in Austria failed. Germany’s tight control
over Austria contributed to this failure. In 1938, the Gestapo arrested the Station Chief of the
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) headquarters in Vienna, leading to the dismantlement of its
existing intelligence network. The new Station Chief did not have sufficient time to restore the
network and obtain enough new intelligence before the SOE began its missions.51
While this was a major setback, the general attitude of the Austrian population played a
more significant role in the SOE’s failure to accomplish its objectives in Austria. An Austrian
resistance did emerge; however, it was far too passive and did not advance the British war effort.
Moreover, as it represented only a minority of Austrians, SOE could not conduct successful
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missions. Peter Wilkinson launched the Clowder Missions, which, like so many other SOE
missions, depended on the support of the local guerrillas. As there were no such forces in
Austria, Wilkinson’s plan failed, as it relied on Josip Broz’s Slovenian-speaking guerrillas who
prioritized claiming land for Yugoslavia over advancing the interests of the Allied war effort.52
In cases where the resistance sought to aid SOE and Austria, its members engaged in
activities such as wearing the national colors and using the traditional Austrian greeting ‘Grüß
Gott’ instead of ‘Heil Hitler’ rather than fomenting unrest or sabotaging strategically important
infrastructure. Faced with these passive forms of resistance, SOE officials lost hope on Austria,
resigning to the fact that “all that can be hoped for is a small degree of sabotage and possibly one
or two coups-de-main.”53 Aside from liberating the city of Tyrol, nothing notable was
accomplished by the Austrian resistance.
As in Austria, the people of Channel Islands did little to resist occupation. While they
were the subject of unsuccessful SOE and commando raids, there were no major sabotage or
resistance initiatives. Viewing them as strategically unimportant, Churchill did not order any
large-scale liberation initiatives for the islands. These endeavors would have been useless, as
British authorities quickly realized that the Islanders had neither the will nor the capacity to resist
the German occupation force. As the Channel Islands were heavily fortified, “any damage would
have had to be made good, with a small resultant drain on total German resources.”54 In addition
to being exceedingly difficult, sabotage missions would have brought about extensive reprisals.
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Through a proclamation in July 1942, the Germans announced that “all inhabitants of the
Channel Islands held in custody were liable to the death penalty in the event of sabotage against
the occupying power.”55 Fearing retaliation, the governments of Guernsey and the other islands
begged their citizens to not engage in resistance or sabotage and encouraged them to instead
follow a policy of passive cooperation. The islanders were justified to fear Nazi reprisals.
Unfortunately, many locals were massacred after successful SOE missions. After being delayed
by SOE and the French Resistance during Operation Jedburgh, the 2nd SS Panzer Division
massacred the village of Oradour-sur-Glane, killing 642 French civilians.56 While drastic, these
reprisals were minor compared to those that followed the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich.
A high-ranking SS officer, Heydrich was appointed viceroy of Bohemia and Moravia, a
western portion of German-occupied Czechoslovakia, in September 1942. Heydrich spearheaded
the initiative to “murder 11 million Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe”57 at the Wannsee Conference
in January 1942. Upon arriving in his assigned province, he began planning its ethnic cleansing
while also dismantling the Czech intelligence agency. As a result of his action hundreds “among
the Czech intelligentsia were executed or sent to concentration camps”, destroying the country’s
spy network and its contacts with Britain.58 Following these tyrannical actions, Dr. Edvard
Beneš, the leader of the London-based Czech government in exile, asked the British government
for help.

55

Cruickshank, The German Occupation of the Channel Islands, 156.
“Special Operations Executive.”
57
Milan Hauner, “Terrorism and Heroism: The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich,” World Policy Journal 24, no. 2
(2007): 86. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40210095.
58
Hauner, “Terrorism and Heroism: The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich,” 87.
56

Allred 14

While a previous report rated Czechoslovakia as the country with the lowest chance of
supporting an effective resistance movement, SOE gladly came to Beneš’ aid. It both equipped
and trained two agents for the assassination of Heydrich. Amidst a series of errors, Josef Gabcík
and Jan Kubiš were able to kill Heydrich. Hearing of the death of one of his best officers, Hitler
was furious and “ordered the arrest and execution of 10,000 Czech hostages.”59 Hitler later
changed halved this number, but his subordinates would carry out further atrocities. “The village
of Lidice, near Prague, was set on fire and entirely leveled by the SS…Two hundred male
inhabitants were shot on the spot, its female population sent to concentration camps and the
children given to German families for adoption.”60
This heinous retaliation causes many to doubt whether the assassination was worth the
cost. Indeed, the levels of devastation were unprecedented and instilled fear amongst occupied
peoples. However, it is important to note that Heydrich had already caused the death of millions
of Jews and was planning to send many more to concentration camps. As death was inevitable
under Heydrich’s reign, assassinating him likely limited the overall toll whilst also depriving
Hitler of a key officer.61 From this perspective, the mission was an undeniable success.
Overall, through various missions across the continent, SOE was able to significantly
contribute to the Allied war effort in occupied Europe. To accomplish this, SOE used subversion,
sabotage, espionage, and assassination. While rivalries with other organizations, complex
political intrigues, and unforeseen setbacks limited its potential contribution, SOE undeniably
advanced the British cause.
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